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THE PRESS IN CONSTRUCTING THE CULTURAL STRATEGIES OF WAR.  





The reason for taking up the issue of  cultural strategies in conflict is the insufficiently 
explored understanding of  the role played by cultural content in military move-
ments which is also unsubstantiated by case studies. At present, the media have become 
an important symbolic force in political activism, serving forms of  power (Herzfeld 
2001, p. 42), which makes them a legitimate area of  research in terms of  the cultural 
strategy employed by the warring factions. Due to the cultural context of  our empirical 
research in Tajikistan, we shall focus on the press. This case is a most interesting one as 
the general opinion is that journalists inspired and even influenced the course of  events 
during the first years of  independence after the collapse of  the Soviet Union and the 
civil war (1992-1997) between the opposition inspired by democratic or Islamic values 
and the post-communists. 
Our understanding of  newspapers as tools used by the warring factions in the frame 
of  their cultural strategies is inspired by the ritual view of  communication proposed by 
James W. Carey. From this perspective, communication means constructing a symbolic 
reality, and through media “a particular view of  the world is portrayed and confirmed” 
(2009, p. 16). Different cultural contents and linguistic methods can be used as new 
means of  either defeating the enemy or bringing peace to a conflict (cf. Čolović 2001; 
Malešević 1998).  
                                                            
1 The research conducted within the project The Cultural Strategies of War and Reconciliation: Analysis on the 
Example of the Civil War in the Republic of Tajikistan (1992-1997), funded by the Polish National Science Center 
(NCN), grant No. 2013/09/D/HS2/00973. 
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Our qualitative content analysis covering examples of  important Tajik opposi-
tional and state publications revealed a variety of  strategies employed by the different 
parties, as attempts to legitimise the position of  their own fraction by referring to local 
tradition, promoting different lifestyles and values, discrediting the enemy – for example 
of  the post-communists by identifying them with the Soviet regime and of  the opposi-
tion by identifying them with Islamic fundamentalists. This article reveals one of  the 
strategies that was an attempt by all of  the key players of  that period to convince Tajik 
society about a designated vision of  a new country. 
 
The media on war 
 
The media have been used to promote conflicts since ancient times, but a crucial period 
in the regular use of  media for political causes were the last two centuries (Jowett, 
O’Donnell 1999; Wolska-Zogata 2012). The press shaped public opinion and whipped 
up war fever during the Crimean War (1853-1856), which was one of  the first conflicts 
reported in the press on a daily basis and immortalised in photographs. The media also 
played a crucial role in the American Civil War (1861-1865), considered to be the one 
of  the earliest industrial wars. The press not only informed the public, but also inter-
preted news according to a certain political orientation and, throughout the 1850s, “in-
creasingly engaged in an editorial war of  words, often portraying the opposing side in 
the most virulent and disparaging terms” (Risley 2012, p. xvi). 
In the twentieth century, the development of  information technology facilitated the 
invention of  successful techniques for mass persuasion. Politicians as well as military 
leaders realised that the press may be used as an effective tool of  impact on society on 
a mass scale (Adamowski 2007, p. 287). Aware of  their importance, during the World 
War I and World War II the authorities controlled the media, using the press and radio 
to build a nationwide unity and to incite hatred against the enemy. 
The evolution of  the role of  the media in contemporary conflicts is researched by 
social scientists, who admitted that media can be directly responsible for inciting violent 
conflicts, as during the Vietnam War or the civil wars in Bosnia, Sierra Leone or Rwanda, 
with the broadcast messages of  the Rwandan Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
“explicitly calling for the murder of  the Tutsi population were believed to have contrib-
uted to the massacre” (Bratic 2008, p. 8; cf. Kirschke 1996).  
Furthermore, the Balkan conflicts demonstrated the growing importance of  local 
media in shaping and developing the violent conflict. Mark Thompson (1999) described 
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the role of  the nationalist press in the war in former Yugoslavia. The media were crucial 
facilitators of  the war between groups of  people who had lived together peacefully all 
their lives. As pointed out by Andrew Puddephatt, “It was a frightening example of  
how a society can disintegrate, how fear can be exploited by the power of  a media in 
the hands of  those unscrupulous enough to wield it as a weapon” (2006, p. 8).  
In the case of  the Balkan conflicts one may examine the role of  the local media in 
preparing the ground for war as well as inspiring ethnic cleansing and mass killings. 
Moreover, the wars in former Yugoslavia showed “that the battle for the hearts and 
minds is as important as the battle for territory. The media arena is often where that 
battle is conducted” (ibidem, p. 9). These conclusions sparked our interest in the situa-
tion of  the media in the internal conflict in Tajikistan, scarcely explored among aca-
demic circles. 
 
Tajikistan’s press and journalism in the 1990s 
 
New ideas, inspired by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of  perestroika (restructuring), ap-
peared in the Tajik press at the end of  the 1980s. The period between 1990 and 1992 
was especially a time of  vitality and radical changes in the press system (Sobczak 2014, 
p. 332). Some journalists call that period the “golden era” of  Tajik journalism, because 
of  press freedom and an open political atmosphere, when journalists wrote about any-
thing they wished, not necessarily following journalist ethics. More than 30 independent 
publications were published that time, and the circulation of  all newspapers and journals 
amounted to 112 million in 1992 – a lot for such a small country (Adinabay 2013, p. 8). 
 According to Ibrohim Usmonov and Davlat Davronov (1997, pp. 149-150), two 
main events led to the development of  the press in Tajikistan at the beginning of  the 
1990s: the Language Law (Qonuni zaboni tojikī (forsī)) issued in 1989, that gave the Tajik 
language the status of  a state language, and mass demonstrations held in Dushanbe in 
February 1990, that ended in violence and fatalities. Afterwards, the oppositional press 
developed, mainly thanks to intellectuals and students, revealing the tensions and prob-
lems in society. Its legal foundation was possible on the basis of  1990 act On Press and 
Other Mass Media (Dar borai matbuot va digar vositahoi akhbori omma), that almost imitated 
the Russian law created half  a year earlier (Adamowski 2002, p. 283). 
The first independent, politically and culturally involved title, was “Rastokhez” (Re-
naissance), published in May 1990. It was a publication of  the People’s Movement 
Rastokhez, founded by some Tajik intellectuals during the period of  perestroika as a tool 
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for the revival of  Tajik culture and their language, as well as other reforms of  Tajik 
society (cf. Nourzhanov, Bleuer 2013, p. 196). Not only were the topics raised in the 
newspaper new, but also the usage of  a standardised font and high-quality paper was 
unusual for the Tajik press at that time. “Rastokhez” was printed illegally, mainly abroad. 
From May 1991 it has been published in Tajikistan as an officially registered publication 
named “Dunyo” (World). As its editor-in-chief  and the head of  Rastokhez movement, 
Tohir Abdujabbor, mentioned, the publication needed to be issued because official party 
press did not inform society of  the true reality (Zarrabin: Debochai matbuoti mustaqili Tojik-
iston 2006).  
Among other journals published by anti-governmental movements and parties we 
have to mention “Adolat” (Justice). Its first issues have also been published abroad, and 
it has been officially printed in Tajikistan from September 1990. The journal was linked 
with the Democratic Party of  Tajikistan (Hizbi Demokratii Tojikiston), founded in the 
Summer of  1990 under the leadership of  Shodmon Yusuf, among others as the result 
of  the split among the activists of  the Rastokhez movement. Another politically in-
volved publication of  that period was “Najot” (Rescue), the official journal of  the Is-
lamic Renaissance Party of  Tajikistan (Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston) under the leader-
ship of  Muhammadsharif  Himmatzoda – the main Tajik oppositional force, founded 
in 1990 on the basis of  the Islamic revival of  that period. The first issues of  “Najot” 
appeared illegally in 1991, but it was officially published from the beginning of  1992. 
The government, dominated by former communists, used the newspapers created 
in the 1920s by the first Tajik communists. The most popular dailies in the Soviet Ta-
jikistan were “Kommunist Tadzhikistana” (Communist of  Tajikistan) in Russian and 
“Tojikistoni Shuravi” (The Soviet Tajikistan) in Tajik, both associated with the Com-
munist Party of  Tajikistan (Hizbi Komunistii Tojikiston). These newspapers were pub-
lished in Dushanbe six times a week and delivered across the country by an efficient 
distribution system (Adamowski 2002, p. 279). After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, 
the media system was taken over by the post-communists and remained almost un-
changed. Being no longer official organs of  the Communist Party, some newspapers 
changed their names (e.g. “Kommunist Tadzhikistana” into “Narodnaya Gazeta”) but 
remained state-owned and associated with the powers-that-be. 
The period of  press independence in Tajikistan soon came to an end after the out-
break of  the civil war in 1992. In March 1993 the Dushanbe prosecutor announced that 
journalists would be held criminally responsible for the passing of  information that 
might destabilise the socio-political situation in the state and incite enmity. He blamed 
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the opposition press for the attempted overthrow of  the constitutional government by 
spreading materials that violated the honour of  the leadership of  the republic (Panfilov 
2003, p. 62).  
Until the end of  1993 all oppositional parties and movements had been banned by 
the Supreme Council’s decision. There was also a ban on issuing their publications 
(ibidem, p. 278-279). Since 1994 new pro-governmental newspapers appeared. Other 
parties and political movements were registered and the ban on the press was lifted in 
1999, i.e. far after the reconciliation that ended the civil war (Akiner 2001, p. 57). 
 
Oppositional press: building a free and united state 
 
One of  the most specific visions of  the Tajiks’ future presented by the opposition was 
described in May 1990 in the fourth edition of  “Rastokhez”, as a part of  the official 
program of  the movement. In fact, the program was written more than a year before 
and this delay might be explained as a result of  a fear that the society as a whole might 
not understand the ideas proposed (Nourzhanov, Bleuer 2013, p. 201). 
The movement’s leader Tohir Abdujabbor explained that Rastokhez stands against 
a totalitarian system, injustice, particracy and bureaucracy and wanted to implement 
a democratic system and give the power to the people (R2 4.1990). The program con-
tained postulates of  conducting free elections, separating the Communist Party from 
the government, informing the public about government activities and demanding 
changes in the constitution based on higher human values, democracy and the right to 
the self-determination of  nations. Tajikistan should be a sovereign country that would 
resolve its political, economic or social problems by itself3.  
In the cultural sphere, Rastokhez’s postulates the rebirth of  national culture and 
traditions, and above all the language (including a return to the Persian-Arabic script), 
as well as disseminating knowledge of  classical literature among citizens. This was to 
remind the Tajiks of  who they were and highlight their links with the Iranians with 
whom they shared not only a common language, but also literature, symbols, customs 
                                                            
2 Abbreviations used for the Tajik publications’ titles: A – “Adolat”, ChR – “Charoghi Ruz”, D – “Dunyo”, 
N – “Najot”, NaG – “Narodnaya Gazeta”, R – “Rastokhez”. 
3 Tajikistan declared its national sovereignty on 25 August 1990. In the referendum on the future of the 
Soviet Union, held on 17 March 1991, the majority of Tajiks (96,85%) voted for preserving a renewed 
federation of equal sovereign republics. Declaration of State Sovereignty was a political act which implied 
the priority of the constitution and laws of the republics, not assuming the national independence and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.  
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and history (R 1990, No. 4). Interestingly, Islam was not mentioned among the national 
values, although we know that these Western-style ideas of  leadership were not always 
in line with what was written in the pamphlets distributed by young and more populist 
activists of  the movement (Nourzhanov, Bleuer 2013, pp. 200-201). 
On the pages of  “Dunyo”, which replaced “Rastokhez”, among the crucial steps for 
rebuilding the country was a need for the awakening of  a Tajik nation as well as acquir-
ing self-knowledge (khudshinosi) (e.g. D 1991, No. 1). The opposition activists appealed 
to the Tajiks: “Open your eyes! Awake from a dream! I am not saying you to take a weapon 
in your hands (...). It is about a future election. It may be done a democratic way” (D 
1991, No. 2). To some extent, a good example was the process of  change taking place 
in Russia and as a symbol of  the success of  democracy the election of  Boris Yeltsin as 
president in 1991 was mentioned (D 1991, No. 2). Interestingly, from the first edition 
of  “Dunyo”, Islam appeared in its pages. Its first article begun with the words “in the 
name of  God forgiving and merciful” (ibidem). 
Over the course of  time, the main force of  democratic-oriented opposition became 
the Democratic Party. The main values promoted on the pages of  their publication 
“Adolat” were solidarity, unity and freedom. The label of  democracy was frequently 
used, although not profoundly explored. At the beginning “Adolat” balanced a discredi-
tation of  the post-communists with a declaration of  openness for cooperation with them 
as a legitimate government (e.g. A 1992, No. 10). The aforementioned idea of  a need to 
awaken the Tajiks was also promoted. Democrats perceived the post-communist as 
those who “keep in the darkness the oppressed people of  Tajikistan, and deceive the 
people” (ChR/A 1991, Sept.) and oppositional intellectuals as the nation’s guides (e.g. 
A 1992 No. 3).  
It should be pointed out that support for the democratic activists’ ideas seemed not 
to be very widespread in Tajik society during that period. Before the presidential election 
in November 1991, they formed an allegiance with an Islamic fraction to increase the 
support for a common oppositional candidate for a new president4. As Shirin Akiner 
stated, the democrats were “able to channel and manipulate popular anger in support of  
particular causes” (2001, p. 40), although in general there was a very little understanding 
between them and the masses, as well as a slight convergence of  interests. Over the course 
                                                            
4 Nine candidates took part in the election. A joint candidate of democrats and Islamic fractions, the film-
maker Davlat Khudonazarov, received about 35 per cent of the vote and lost in favour of a previous First 
Party Secretary, Rahmon Nabiyev, who received a mere 57 per cent (Akiner 2001, p. 35). 
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of  time, the main force of  the opposition became a movement linked to Islamic values, 
the rebirth of  Islam, mainly centred around the Islamic Renaissance Party. 
The fascinating question about the promotion the country’s rebirth arises when it 
comes to this second opposition’s fraction. The first texts of  the Party’s official publi-
cation “Najot” referred more to Muslims beyond national borders, opposing national-
ism and the concept of  a “nation“ (millat) in the modern sense (N 1991, No. 4), focusing 
rather on what one might call an umma – the unity of  all Muslims. However, very soon 
it shifted towards the idea of  the residents of  Tajikistan and “the Tajik people” (khalqi 
tojik or mardumi tojik).  
In “Najot” the idea of  the establishment of  a confessional state was not proposed, 
and at the same time the idea of  the separation of  state and religion was somewhat 
criticized: “Islam is not limited to a mosque and madrasa, but it concerns the life actions 
and social reality” (N 1991, No. 1). The separation was presented as a mistake made by 
those influenced by Marxist-Leninism ideology with no proper knowledge of  Islam (N 
1992, No. 9). Moreover, the Islamic Republic of  Iran established after the Islamic Revo-
lution of  1979 was the main reference point when it comes to a model country. It was 
presented as a good example to be followed on political, social and moral levels (e.g. 
N 1991, No. 4; N 1992, No. 5).  
 
The official press: building a stable and national state 
 
The Tajik government attempted to dominate the informational environment in order 
to neutralise the role of  the democratic and Islamic media mainly by creating a positive 
vision of  a democratic, secular and national state. The press controlled by the govern-
ment asserted that peace and stability could be ensured only via a legitimate govern-
ment. The “civic and national agreement” (NaG 3 Sept. 1991) is necessary to build the 
rule of  law and the legal government and institutions should be supported both by the 
media as well as political and social organisations and parties. They are able to create 
the “state of  harmony and unity”, based on rights and freedoms guaranteed to every 
citizen regardless of  race, national origin and religion (NaG 4 Apr. 1992). 
With the development of  the conflict between the government and the opposition, 
emphasizing that a Tajikistan governed by the post-communists is a state friendly and 
safe for residents from different ethnic and linguistic groups (especially Russians and 
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Uzbeks) intensified. The opposition was blamed for wanting to create a totalitarian Is-
lamic state and expel the Russian-speaking population and Uzbeks from Tajikistan 
(NaG 28 Nov. 1992).  
Therefore, it was important to defeat them as quickly as possible and integrate them 
into the state structure. “Narodnaya Gazeta” (People’s Newspaper) repeatedly stressed 
that only the government created in Khujand in November 1992 during the Sixteenth 
Session of  the Supreme Council could guarantee the peaceful unifica-tion of  all inhab-
itants of  the republic and end the bloody, fratricidal struggle. The Session prevented 
“the annihilation of  the nation” (NaG 28 Nov. 1992) and started the process of  building 
a democratic state (NaG 18 Mar. 1993).  
 According to governmental newspapers, the opposition was a destructive force 
which disrupted legitimate authority in its constructive mission. As an exacerbation of  
the conflict, the government side started to represent the opposition as more and more 
dangerous and fanatical enemies. They were described as “armed terrorists” (NaG 29 
Sept. 1992), “criminal groups” (NaG 25 Nov. 1992) and “politi-al extremists” (NaG 17 
Nov. 1992). It should be mentioned that invoking the fear of  Islamic fundamentalism 
helped justify the introduction of  the Commonwealth of  Independent States troops, 
mainly Russian and Uzbek, on the territory of  Tajikistan (NaG 18 Sept. 1992). 
Another strategy adopted by the government newspapers, when Tajikistan turned 
into an independent state, was to focus on de-sovietisation and emphasize the meaning 
of  national heritage. The newspapers changed their logos and names, while communist 
iconography gradually began to be replaced by new, national symbols. Nationalist con-
cepts were used by the post-communists to enlist public support and to assert a new 
Tajik identity. The Tajik people were assured that the present rulers were the heirs of  
legitimate authority and guarantors of  the rebirth of  national culture and heritage.  
The shift towards tradition and the nation did not mean a total “renunciation” of  the 
communist past. From mid-1992 particularly, the Soviet past was described as a period of  
stability and the perestroika époque – as a period of  chaos and economic decline (NaG 
25 Nov. 1992). The governmental leaders used this sense of  nostalgia for the stability 
of  the Soviet past, shared by the majority of  the population of  the country (Mullojanov 
2015, p. 215) in order to discredit the opposition reformist activities, which only brought 









Considering how quickly it was banned and that many independent journalists suf-
fered persecution or faced death may suggest that the independent press was per-
ceived as a influential medium used to promote anti-governmental ideas. It is impossi-
ble to analyse the role of  the press during the civil war in Tajikistan, as the independent 
press was banned soon after its outbreak and almost disappeared5. Therefore, our study 
has been restricted to the unsettled period of  building a new state and the dawn of  the 
war. Among the cultural strategies employed by opposition parties that were uncovered 
in the course of  our analysis, we decided to show how both sides sought to engage 
public interest by the vision of  a new Tajikistan in the context of  reforms and later the 
total dissolution of  the Soviet Union. 
Specific ideas of  how both opposition and government imagined the new state were 
rather blurred. It seemed they were mainly focused on the need to split from their op-
ponents and consolidate around specific slogans, rather than deeply thought-out ideas. 
Generally, the Tajik opposition in the initial period of  state-rebuilding sought to build 
roads out of  the crisis, proposed social, economic and cultural reforms of  the Tajik 
nation, as well the unity of  the people. Both factions – the democratic and Muslim 
– stressed a lack of  freedom. They claimed their readiness to influence society and shape 
the direction of  change – in their own opinion, only the opposition could implement 
changes designed to exit from a deep crisis and build a strong state – or the democratic 
and free version supported by the Democrats, or governed in accordance with Islamic 
values as the Islamic opposition wished.  
On the other hand, the post-communist nomenclature tried to use the press to create 
the impression that only they are able to guarantee peace, unity and the salvation of  the 
nation. The government’s strategy was to refer to the need for stability and security as 
well as to the sense of  nostalgia for the Soviet past, shared by the majority of  the Tajiks. 
The contemporary elite was compared to the heroes of  the Socialist Republic of  Tajik-
istan and the mission to building a new independent state – to build communism. Peo-
ple needed reassuring that the government, led by the President – the father of  the 
nation – cares about their needs and is able to provide them with all the means to live 
comfortably.  
                                                            
5 There were cases of illegal publication as well as opposition publications issued for example in Afghani-
stan, but they are not accessible. 
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The article describes the role of  the press in constructing the cultural strategies 
of  war on the example from the conflict in the Republic of  Tajikistan (1992-
1997). On the basis of  qualitative analysis newspapers published in Russian and 
Tajik we present one of  these strategies – the efforts of  the key factions of  the 
conflict (the post-communists, the democratic opposition, the Islamic opposi-
tion) to convince Tajik society to a certain, designated vision of  a new, independ-
ent Tajikistan. 
 




E-mail contact to the Authors: elzbieta.olzacka@uj.edu.pl, paulina.niechcial@uj.edu.pl 
93
